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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EAT:edm
TO : THE DIRECTOR
FROM : Mr. E. A. Tamm
SUBJECT:

DATE: 9/3/45

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Attached hereto is the proposed letter to General Vaughan outlining in summary form the accomplishments of the SIS program. Extra carbon copies of the summary memorandum are attached.

There is also attached hereto a seven-page, over-all memorandum dated September 3rd, which analyzes the new General Donovan plan, the FBI plan, the former General Donovan plan, and the Army plan. If you desire to use this memorandum without the addition of the first Donovan plan and the Army plan, this memorandum could be utilized in its three-page form by merely eliminating pages four to seven.

There is also attached hereto, dated September 3rd, a shorter memorandum analyzing the General Donovan current or new plan, and the FBI plan with emphasis on the relationship between policing operations and intelligence operations. This memorandum was prepared in accord with your instruction upon the basis of its possible transmittal to Bob Hannegan.

There is [redacted] a copy of a page and one-quarter memorandum which [redacted] furnished to Snyder within the past [redacted] I received a copy of this memorandum [redacted] for my information.

There is also attached in summary form a memorandum setting forth chronologically the developments of Friday and Saturday in this situation.

Attachments

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Authority NND 873777
by A.M.P. DATE 11-18-87

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

September 3, 1945

INT 541/2

Intelligence operations of the Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to and during the war resulted in the complete disclosure and control of Axis espionage, sabotage and subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere. The effectiveness of this work has been described by Field Marshal Hermann Goering of the German High Command who in a recent interview with an SIS representative stated that he believed no information of value had been received by the German High Command from the Western Hemisphere because most of their agents had been caught and the information transmitted by their agents appeared to be colored to such an extent that the superiors of the intelligence organization in Germany believed these agents in the Western Hemisphere were being controlled by the Allies.

A comprehensive picture of the results obtained by SIS activities can be visualized by the fact that such operations were directly responsible for the identification of 806 espionage agents and the apprehension by Allied authorities of 327 espionage agents, the location of 24 clandestine enemy radio stations, the confiscation of 28 radio transmitters and the recovery of funds, strategic material and property valued in excess of \$1,000,000, most of which was confiscated by Governmental authorities in Latin America. Many of the agents apprehended were convicted in the courts of the respective Latin American countries, one, namely Heinz Luning, received the death penalty in a court and was executed. Others, though not convicted, were subjected to internment or relegation to a place of forced residence.

The success of SIS operations in Latin America is illustrated by results obtained in Brazil where data had been acquired prior to the war concerning seven major clandestine radio espionage rings operating in that country. When the Brazilian Government declared war against Germany, it was possible to refer to Brazilian authorities through diplomatic channels sufficient data regarding German intelligence operations to enable the Brazilians to convict some seventy-five individuals and mete out sentences totaling 1,252 years.

Successful intelligence operations in the Republic of Chile resulted in the disclosure of three widespread German clandestine radio rings involved in espionage activities which were liquidated after information was submitted to the Chilean Government through appropriate channels. In some countries such as Argentina where positive action against enemy agents was not taken, their activities were closely observed, the principals involved were identified, their channels of communication monitored, and by this means SIS representatives in Argentina and other localities were able to cope with this menace, and thereby negate the results obtained by the enemy.

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It has been definitely established by a statement from Albert Julius von Appen, German saboteur leader, that action in disclosing and controlling the activities of German sabotage and espionage agents resulted in other agents refusing to be of further assistance to their superiors in Germany. Von Appen had been trained by the German High Command and dispatched to South America to form a widespread sabotage organization. He, associated with Dr. Georg Blass of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, succeeded in formulating an extensive ring for the purpose of sabotaging the Allied war effort throughout South America. Following the disclosure of Von Appen's identity, as a result of SIS operations, he and all other members of this ring refrained from taking affirmative action on any planned sabotage mission. Thus, the enemy's plans in this field were frustrated as no instances of successful enemy inspired sabotage have been revealed.

Data acquired concerning German, Italian and Japanese subversive organizations, propaganda efforts and economic penetration greatly assisted our Government's program to effect complete security of the Western Hemisphere. These data made possible through cooperation with Latin American Governments the deportation of 4,924 enemy aliens, many of whom were removed to the United States for internment, the removal of 7,064 enemy aliens from strategic areas in Latin America, caused the liquidation of enemy commercial holdings, removed the threat of penetration by subversive organizations, and made great contributions to information used in setting up the list of blocked enemy nationals.

In many instances information involving subversive groups and underground organizations of unfriendly and enemy personalities has been obtained which established activities detrimental to the solidarity and security of the Western Hemisphere. As a typical example, it was revealed by SIS operations that German agents associated with Argentine nationalists collaborated with revolutionists responsible for the Bolivian revolt of December, 1943. These same elements at the same time endeavored to block United States influence in Latin America through a plan of aiding the rise of revolutionary military governments who would be unfriendly to the United States and her Allies in the war. Knowledge of their plans developed through intelligence operations of SIS enabled the United States to consummate plans to successfully offset these maneuvers.

Efforts by representatives of the German High Command to flee to this Hemisphere are presently under observation. The close cooperation between SIS representatives and Allied intelligence authorities, both in the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, has assisted in the recent apprehension of Hans Zuehlendorf, known German agent, while fleeing to South America and has supplied a valuable flow of intelligence information of interest to our Government.

Despite extensive operations throughout the Western Hemisphere, the SIS organization has neither been the cause of any embarrassment to the Government of the United States nor the subject of any unfavorable publicity.

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September 3, 1945

PROPOSALS FOR UNITED STATES

SECRET WORLD-WIDE INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

RECENT PROPOSAL BY GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Provisions

General Donovan has recently proposed that there be established a world-wide intelligence organization to operate directly out of the Office of the President. The identity of the head of this organization would be secret, and he would be under the sole control of and responsible to the President, without any reference to existing agencies. The information gathered would be reported direct to the President. It was suggested that this organization could utilize personnel from the Office of Strategic Services which is being discontinued, and that the director of the organization should be a "party man", that is, a member of the same party of the President.

Objections

There are numerous serious and obvious objections to the proposal for this secret intelligence organization. From the political point of view, it would constitute a hazard to the President, in that its operations would lead to accusations by the public, newspapers, and Congress of the operations of a secret state police or a "Gestapo," with all the unpleasant connotations these terms imply. The naming of a "party man" as head of the organization would seriously prejudice continuity of operations, which would be essential to a successful intelligence organization.

The reporting of the information gathered direct to the President would burden the President with detail which he could not hope to assimilate or adequately use. The furnishing of information without coordination, analysis, or assimilation by the regular agencies of the Government which are concerned in the making of policy particularly in connection with foreign affairs, presents a grave danger of coloring the information presented, or of the presentation of a distorted and one-sided viewpoint.

The funneling of information through the President would result in delay in getting the information to the executive agencies, which must act upon it. In many instances it would lead to the executive agencies' taking necessary emergency action without adequate information, inasmuch as information would not be directly furnished to them by the proposed agency. The creation of a new secret intelligence agency would necessitate the setting up of a ponderous organization and lead to overlapping, duplication, and strife in connection with the regularly established agencies of the United States Government. The regular agencies must necessarily continue their statutory functions in the intelligence field.

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This proposal is essentially the generally discredited plan of operations of British Intelligence. The British plan failed the Empire miserably prior to the war and was inadequate during the war period. It was not informed of enemy activities in Europe and Latin America. For instance, the British were not informed of the departure of German saboteurs for the Western Hemisphere. The British system is characterized by a complicated superstructure, lack of coordination, and the lack of an efficient system of operation.

THE FBI PLAN

Basic Needs for World-Wide Intelligence Coverage

Secret world-wide intelligence coverage for the benefit of the United States Government must have as its primary objectives the providing to the executive branches of the Government basic data on a world-wide scale upon which plans may be formulated and action taken, and the insuring of internal security from the threat of infiltrating foreign agents, ideologies, and military conquest. Such an organization, to be effective, must be streamlined, mobile, and fluid, and should not be burdened with a ponderous superstructure, since its efficiency is dependent upon such simplicity of structure as will assure secrecy and flexibility of operations. It should operate on a broad scale, without duplicating or precluding the technical functions carried on by other Government Departments not operating the security field in foreign countries.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has in operation in the Western Hemisphere a plan based on such simplicity of structure which has functioned efficiently, secretly and economically since prior to Pearl Harbor, and which has proved its adaptability to world-wide coverage by the effectiveness of its operation in the Western Hemisphere field.

Basic Plan of Operation

It is proposed that the time-proved program in operation in the Western Hemisphere be extended on a world-wide basis, with certain modifications. The provisions of the FBI plan are:

The joint operation in every country of the world, except those which are active theaters of operation, of the Office of Military Intelligence, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, each as a specialist in its own field and able to operate without duplication of effort, but closely correlating their operations to insure complete coverage.

This plan would not call for any superstructure whatsoever, but would continue to operate with the same committee as originally set up by the President composed of the Directors of Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the addition of a representative of policy-making rank for the State Department. There should, however, also be set up a committee to control basic policy composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Attorney General.

There would be stationed in each country a Military Attache, a Naval Attache, and an FBI representative, the latter openly attached to the Embassy with a nominal title such as Legal Attache. Each of the three Attaches would have clearly defined responsibility, as presently outlined in the Western Hemisphere, and each of these Attaches would have a sufficient number of open personnel upon his staff to permit proper gathering, correlation and transmission of information. In addition, each would operate such

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an undercover organization as is necessary to a proper discharge of defined responsibility under all of the circumstances existing in a particular country. Undercover agents operating on special assignment will function either directly under Attaches or direct from the Washington headquarters of the three intelligence agencies when the occasion justifies.

Adequate communications facilities to insure the prompt transmission to Washington, D. C., of all information obtained should be established. The FBI already operates a network of open and clandestine radio stations blanketing the Western Hemisphere. The communications facilities of the War and Navy Departments are established and well known.

A unit for evaluation and analysis would be established in the State Department to which the three operating agencies would furnish intelligence data for appropriate review, analysis, and utilization in international matters.

Facility of Operation

As indicated heretofore, the program proposed above has proved its effectiveness, is already in operation, requires no elaborate superstructure, and the interested agencies have available trained personnel and operating facilities for recruiting, training and dispatching additional personnel. The plan, consequently, can be placed in operation by the President merely extending the authority heretofore given to the Directors of Military and Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for operation in the Western Hemisphere to operate on a worldwide basis.

This plan has produced in the Western Hemisphere a maximum amount of information with a minimum of operating personnel and expense, because it is confined to those agencies which are primarily responsible for the security activities of the United States Government. It does not provide for an elaborate analysis and policy-making structure to perform duties which are already assigned by statute to the executive branches of the United States Government. Its secrecy is assured through the dissemination of the operations among the already existing Government agencies which have previously operated successfully in their respective fields for a long period.

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THE PLAN PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

In November, 1944, a plan was proposed by General William J. Donovan, to the President, and providing for the creation of a new agency in the Executive Office of the President, with a Director to coordinate and direct the functions as an over-all control of existing intelligence agencies of the Government, with respect to collection, analysis, and dissemination of world-wide intelligence information. With respect to the jurisdiction of the Director, Section I of the plan provides, "Subject to the approval of the President, the Director may exercise his powers, authorities and duties through such officials or agencies in such a manner as he may determine." This agency would be free of any departmental control; however, Section II provides for an advisory board consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State, and such others as the President may appoint, which board "shall advise and assist the Director with respect to the formulation of basic policies and plans of the (agency)."

This agency, according to the enumeration of its functions and duties in the plan, would have the power to set up its own world-wide organization or to operate through the other Governmental organizations in collection of "pertinent information including military, economic, political, and scientific ...". It would be empowered to call upon any other agency of the Government to furnish "appropriate specialists for such supervisory and functional positions within the (agency) as may be required." A broad grant of power with respect to evaluation and dissemination of information, as well as policy making is contained in Section III (c) as follows: "Final evaluation, synthesis, and dissemination within the Government of the intelligence required to enable the Government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war, and the advancement of broad national policy." All Government departments and agencies are required to make available to the Director such intelligence material as the Director may request, without any restrictions. Within the limits of a fund provided by an independent budget, the Director is empowered to "provide for the internal organization and management of the (agency) in such manner as he may determine."

Objections

Effect on the Regular Government Agencies

This plan provides for a superagency which would be empowered to function without any reference to departmental authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility. The existing departments charged by statute with specific responsibilities would necessarily overlap and duplicate the intelligence-gathering functions of the proposed agency in connection with discharging these responsibilities, and thus there would be increased duplication and confusion in this field. If the new agency chose to operate in any specified field through an existing intelligence organization, it would be authorized to direct the activities of the organization without reference to the

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statutory departmental head. Since the plan is not confined to operations in foreign fields, but would include direction of domestic intelligence, it would superimpose upon existing agencies a control and direction which would unavoidably result in conflict between the discharge of the responsibilities established by Congress for existing agencies, and the independent program of the new agency. Also, the powers granted this agency to draft personnel of the existing agencies of the Government, to operate at will in fields assigned by statute to existing agencies, and to direct the activities of such agencies, would create tremendous problems of administration, morale, and legal questions, and would endanger the normal functions of the regularly constituted agencies.

Cost

To consummate the Donovan plan would require a tremendous amount of preparation, training, and augmentation, as well as tremendous expenditures. Inasmuch as it would be a new agency, the original organization, the employment of the necessary personnel, and the expenditures incidental to beginning its activities throughout the world, would require an immense budget which would constitute a target for legislative bodies and budget-making groups. It is obvious that the agency's expenditures would duplicate at least for a time the expenditures of the regular agencies of the Government already operating in this field and in fields in connection with other departmental functions throughout the world.

Analysis and Policy Making

An inevitable and unavoidable danger would result in the information-gathering agency also performing the analysis functions for policy-making purposes, independent of the agencies which must execute their duties based on this analysis. The agency in presenting its independent analysis of the information gathered would in effect control "national planning and security" of the regular Governmental agencies, inasmuch as they would be dependent on the agency for basic policy making, and would not have access to the original information. The danger of bias and of coloring of the information gathered and of the final analysis would be inherent. It is believed that the analysis and research functions incidental to the operations of any intelligence agency designated to operate throughout the world should be placed in the State Department.

Secrecy

Secrecy of operation, because of the overhead structure, size, and complexity of the proposed organization, would be impossible. The elaborateness of the proposed structure would necessarily involve an elaborate and numerically large organization. Without secrecy of operation, no intelligence agency can efficiently function or perform the duty for which it exists: that of gathering secret information.

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PLAN PROPOSED BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Provisions

Essentially the plan submitted by the Joint Intelligence Committee is the same as that proposed by General William J. Donovan in so far as operations are concerned. The Committee proposed the creation of a national intelligence authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff to the President, "charged with responsibility for such over-all intelligence planning and development, and such inspection and coordination of all Federal intelligence activities as to assure the more effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." The national intelligence authority would establish a central intelligence agency headed by a director appointed by the President and recommended by the authority. The Director would have a purely advisory committee composed of the heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies subject to definition and coordination by the national intelligence authority.

The Central Intelligence Agency would plan for the coordination of the activities of all intelligence agencies of the Government and recommend to the national intelligence authorities over-all policies and objectives. The existing intelligence agencies would continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize and disseminate departmental operating intelligence but would be required to make the intelligence information collected available to the Central Intelligence Agency. Section IV (c) of the plan provides that the agency perform services of common concern for the benefit of departmental intelligence agencies, "including the direct procurement of intelligence." Thus, this agency not only may direct the activities of the regular agencies of the Government, but may operate directly in the intelligence field throughout the world. This plan gives power to the Director with the approval of the national intelligence authority to call upon other departments and independent agencies of the Government to furnish specialists as required. An added power is given to inspect the organization and operation of any other existing intelligence agency. The agency is charged with the synthesis of the departmental intelligence and "the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence."

Objections

Impracticability of Operation

The basic objection to this plan is that the establishment of such a superstructure would be impracticable for operational purposes. It would in effect in large part divorce the operational field from the administrative or policy field, which has been shown to be most impractical.

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The creation of the superstructure proposed would be on such a scale as to make simplicity and fluidity of operation impossible. Confusion and delay would be inherent in the operation of the plan due to the departmental agencies being charged with performing the functions regularly assigned to them and at the same time the Central Intelligence Agency operating in the same field.

Effect on Regular Government Agencies

The power to inspect the organization and operations of existing intelligence agencies would give a form of control to the Central Intelligence Agency independent of the heads of the departments and would tend to introduce confusion in the regular operations of the regular departments of the Government. The program would result in conflict between Congressional enactments and operating directives, producing a problem of cleavage between the intelligence agency and the Congress, which would inevitably result in publicity and possible Congressional enactment in restraint of this agency's operations. The power to draft personnel of the existing agencies would create problems of administration, authority and operations of the regular agencies that would endanger the performing of the normal functions assigned the regularly constituted agencies. This plan does not confine its provisions to foreign intelligence, but would attempt to enter the domestic intelligence field, thereby adding an unnecessary agency in a field which is already thoroughly and adequately covered without confusion or duplication.

Analysis Functions

The analysis of information by the intelligence agency charged with collecting it without regard to the agencies of the Government which must perform the executive functions would unavoidably lead to coloring of the analysis in accordance with the viewpoint of the intelligence agency. In effect the regular executive agencies of the Government charged by statute with national planning and policies would be controlled by the agency making its independent analysis, upon which these policies and the national plans are made.

Secrecy

Secrecy of operation, which is absolutely essential to a successful intelligence organization, would be impossible under this program because of the large administrative and directing personnel necessary. The agency could not hope to perform its task of gathering secret information without secrecy of operations which would be lacking under this plan.

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September 3, 1945

U. S. SECRET WORLD-WIDE INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

RECENT PROPOSAL BY GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

The proposal by General Donovan for the establishment of a world-wide intelligence organization to operate directly out of the office of the President and to be headed by a "party man" whose identity would be kept secret is open to many serious objections. In connection with this proposal, General Donovan has stated that intelligence is not related to police work.

From the political point of view, the proposed organization would constitute a hazard to the President, in that its operations would lead to accusations by the public, newspapers, and Congress of the operations of a secret state police or a "Gestapo", with all the unpleasant connotations these terms imply. The naming of a "party man" as head of the organization would seriously prejudice continuity of operations, which would be essential to a successful intelligence organization.

The reporting of the information gathered direct to the President would burden the President with detail which he could not hope to assimilate or adequately use. The furnishing of information without coordination, analysis, or assimilation by the regular agencies of the Government which are concerned in the making of policy, particularly in connection with foreign affairs, presents a grave danger of coloring the information presented, or of the presentation of a distorted and one-sided viewpoint.

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This proposal is essentially the generally discredited plan of operations of British Intelligence. The British plan failed the Empire miserably prior to the war and was inadequate during the war period. It was not informed of enemy activities in Europe and Latin America. For instance, the British were not informed of the departure of German saboteurs for the Western Hemisphere. The British system is characterized by a complicated superstructure, lack of coordination, and the lack of an efficient system of operation.

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Any contention that it is not possible to combine police work with intelligence coverage is entirely without merit. All police work specifically involves the gathering of intelligence and the problem involved is not dissimilar to that of gathering security intelligence for the benefit of the United States Government. In fact, it is not possible to separate the gathering of intelligence from police functions, inasmuch as there are numerous criminal statutes such as those relating to espionage and sabotage which are directly concerned with the intelligence field.

It should be noted that one of the major factors in the control of espionage, sabotage and other subversive activities in the United States was the coordination of efforts of the various police organizations in the United States through the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the war period. Likewise, in Latin America the police liaison established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation through its Special Intelligence Service was a major factor in completely negating enemy activities of all types in that area.

THE FBI PLAN

Basic Needs for World-Wide Intelligence Coverage

Secret world-wide intelligence coverage for the benefit of the United States Government must have as its primary objectives the providing to the executive branches of the Government basic data on a world-wide scale upon which plans may be formulated and action taken, and the insuring of internal security from the threat of infiltrating foreign agents, ideologies, and military conquest. Such an organization, to be effective, must be streamlined, mobile, and fluid, and should not be burdened with a ponderous superstructure, since its efficiency is dependent upon such simplicity of structure as will assure secrecy and flexibility of operations. It should operate on a broad scale, without duplicating or precluding the technical functions carried on by other Government Departments not operating in the security field in foreign countries.

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Basic Plan of Operation

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Investigation for operation in the Western Hemisphere to operate on a world-wide basis.

This plan has produced in the Western Hemisphere a maximum amount of information with a minimum of operating personnel and expense, because it is confined to those agencies which are primarily responsible for the security activities of the United States Government. It does not provide for an elaborate analysis and policy-making structure to perform duties which are already assigned by statute to the executive branches of the United States Government. Its secrecy is assured through the dissemination of the operations among the already existing Government agencies which have previously operated successfully in their respective fields for a long period.

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